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ASSESSING DOCTORS AS REASONABLE
DOCTORS AND AS REASONABLE
PERSONS: A REMINDER IN THE
CONTEXT OF NEGLIGENT
TRANSMISSION OF HIV DURING ARTIFICIAL
INSEMINATION
Donald G. Casswell*
I. ASSESSING DOCTORS AS REASONABLE DOCTORS AND AS
REASONABLE PERSONS
In negligence law generally, whether a person was negligent is determined
by assessing his or her conduct against that of the reasonable person.' The
reasonable person test works well in most cases in which negligence is al-
leged. The judge or the jury, as the case may be, uses common sense to
assess the conduct of the defendant.
However, the reasonable person (reasonable judge, reasonable juror)
knows little or nothing about the practice of medicine and is incompetent to
assess a doctor's acts or omissions. That is, the reasonable person test sim-
ply does not work in determining allegations of medical negligence. There-
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thank Sandra J. Harper, Barrister and Solicitor, McConnan, Bion, O'Connor & Peterson, Vic-
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1. ALLEN M. LINDEN, CANADIAN TORT LAW 115-17 (4th ed. 1988). Justice Linden
writes:
The measuring rod used in negligence law to judge an actor's conduct is the rea-
sonable person. ...
This is an objective standard, not a subjective one. An impersonal test is em-
ployed, which eliminates the personal equation and is independent of the idiosyncra-
sies of the particular person whose conduct is in question. If it were otherwise,
negligence would be coextensive with the judgment of each individual, which would
be as variable as the length of the foot of each individual leaving so vague a line as to
afford no rule at all, the degree of judgment belonging to each individual being infi-
nitely various.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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fore, of necessity the law defers to medical practice and expert medical
opinion. Parachuted into the place of the "reasonable person" is the "rea-
sonable doctor." As the Supreme Court of Canada has more elaborately
stated: "What the [doctor] by his ordinary engagement undertakes with the
patient is that he possesses the skill, knowledge and judgment of the general-
ity or average of the special group or class of technicians to which he belongs
and will faithfully exercise them."2
Of particular relevance to the case I will consider in the next section of
this essay, the medical standard of reasonableness includes keeping informed
about authoritative medical literature.3 However, that obligation certainly
does not require a doctor to read every medical journal article. As the Eng-
lish Court of Appeal put it: "[lit would be putting too high a burden on a
medical man to say that he must read every article in the medical press."4
In exception to the medical standard of reasonableness, if a non-medically
trained person can understand the relevant facts of a medical case, the law
need not defer to medical practice. In Chasney v. Anderson,' the facts were
that a five-year-old child died after a tonsillectomy when he suffocated be-
cause a sponge had been left in his throat.6 The defendant surgeon had used
sponges without tapes attached, even though such sponges were available,
and had not kept count of sponges used during the operation, even though
such a count would have been kept by the operating room nurses upon his
request.7 Medical opinion evidence at trial indicated that the operation had
been "performed in the same manner as other surgeons perform[ed] it" and
that it was "not customary" to count sponges.' On this basis, the court
dismissed the action of the deceased's father.9
On appeal, a majority of the Manitoba Court of Appeal reversed and held
the surgeon liable in negligence.'" Commenting on the expert medical evi-
dence concerning customary practice, Coyne, J.A., one of the majority
judges, stated:
There is no question as to whether ... the operation itself was
conducted in a surgically skillful manner nor even whether or how
2. Wilson v. Swanson, 1956 S.C.R. 804, 811 (Can.).
3. See, e.g., McLean v. Weir, [1980] 4 W.W.R. 330, 334-35 (B.C. Ct. App.).
4. Crawford v. Board of Governors of Charing Cross Hosp., LONDON TIMES, Dec. 8,
1953, at 5, 5.
5. [1948] 4 D.L.R. 458 (Man. K.B.), rev'd in part, [1949] 4 D.L.R. 71 (Man. Ct. App.),
aff'd, [1950] 4 D.L.R. 223 (Can.).
6. [1948] 4 D.L.R. at 458-59.
7. Id. at 459.
8. Id. at 461.
9. Id.
10. [1949] 4 D.L.R. 71 (Man. Ct. App.), aff'd, [1950] 4 D.L.R. 223 (Can.).
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sponges should be used in such an operation. The case involves no
difficult or uncertain questions of medical or surgical treatment nor
any of an abstruse or scientific or highly technical character. It is
the ordinary question of whether, as a matter of reasonable care,
certain obvious and simple precautions are required to be taken,
something easily understood by ordinary individuals....
Ordinary common sense dictates that when simple methods to
avoid danger have been devised, are known, and are available, non-
user, with fatal results, cannot be justified by saying that others
also have been following the same old, less-careful practice; and
that when such methods are readily comprehensible by the ordi-
nary person, ... it is quite within the competency of Court or jury,
quite as much as of experts to deal with the issues; and that the
existence of a practice which neglects them, even if the practice
were general, cannot protect the defendant surgeon."
In brief and unanimous reasons, the Supreme Court of Canada subse-
quently agreed. 2 In short, one need not be medically trained to know that a
sponge in the throat increases the risk of suffocation and death, that count-
ing sponges reduces the risk that a sponge is left in a patient's throat, and
that using sponges with tapes attached reduces the risk that a sponge is left
in a patient's throat. In her leading textbook on Canadian medical law,
Madam Justice Ellen Picard states the matter as follows:
The Supreme Court of Canada [held]... that expert evidence as to
approved practice is not conclusive, especially where the conduct
being questioned is not technical but relates to taking precautions.
The [Court] decided that, as far as non-technical matters are con-
cerned, an ordinary person is competent to determine what is a
safe practice and held the defendant negligent.'
3
II. A REMINDER IN THE CONTEXT OF NEGLIGENT TRANSMISSION OF
HIV DURING ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
In Ter Neuzen v. Korn, 4 the plaintiff patient alleged that she had been
infected with HIV during an artificial insemination procedure in January
1985 and that the infection was due to negligence on the part of the defend-
ant gynecologist who performed the procedure. On November 20, 1991, a
11. Id. at 86-87.
12. [1950] 4 D.L.R. 223 (Can.).
13. ELLEN I. PICARD, LEGAL LIABILITY OF DOCTORS AND HOSPITALS IN CANADA 234
(2d ed. 1984).
14. No. C870065 (B.C. Sup. Ct. filed Jan. 7, 1987) (Can.). This case was initially com-
menced in the Vancouver Registry, but trial venue was then changed from Vancouver to Vic-
toria. The jury rendered its verdict on Nov. 20, 1991.
1993]
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British Columbia Supreme Court jury found the gynecologist liable and as-
sessed damages of almost $900,000.15
The patient submitted four bases for the allegation of negligence, namely:
1. The gynecologist failed to screen the semen used in the artifi-
cial insemination procedure for HIV;
2. He failed to make reasonable inquiries about the background
of the semen donor;
3. He failed to obtain the patient's informed consent in that he
failed to warn her of the possibility of HIV infection during the
artificial insemination program; and
4. He failed to discontinue the artificial insemination program
when he knew or ought to have known that continuing the pro-
gram entailed a risk of supplying HIV-infected semen to the
patient.
The jury was asked to answer the following question: "Was there negli-
gence on the part of the defendant which led to the infection suffered by the
plaintiff'." The jury answered "Yes." While the jury found the gynecologist
negligent, it is impossible to know the precise basis for that finding since they
were not asked to identify the conduct that constituted negligence. 16 Fur-
ther, in Canadian practice it is not permitted to question jurors out of court
concerning the reasons for their verdict. However, following the verdict it
was widely speculated in the media that the basis for the jury's finding of
negligence, or at least part of the basis for that finding, must have been Dr.
Korn's admission at trial that he was not aware in early 1985 of a letter to
the editor published in the October 27, 1983, issue of The New England
Journal of Medicine.1 7 That letter was written by Dr. Laurene Mascola of
the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta, Georgia, Bryan Colwell of
Harvard University, and Janet A. Couch of the University of Georgia. The
letter, published under the title, Should Sperm Donors Be Screened for Sexu-
ally Transmitted Diseases?, suggested that "the agent responsible for the ac-
quired immunodeficiency syndrome" might "possibly" be transmitted in
semen.' 8 My purpose in this essay is to examine the reasonableness of the
15. Gabor Mate, When Lawyers and Doctors Spar, Justice Often Suffers, VANCOUVER
SUN, Feb. 15, 1992, at E9, E9. An appeal to the British Columbia Court of Appeal has been
commenced. See Ter Neuzen v. Korn, appeal docketed, No. CA014811 (B.C. Ct. App.). The
appeal was argued on Nov. 16-17, 1992.
16. The defendant had submitted that a question be put to the jury asking for the basis of
a finding of negligence. The trial judge declined the submission.
17. Laurene Mascola et al., Should Sperm Donors be Screened for Sexually Transmitted
Diseases?, 309 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1058, 1058 (1983).
18. Id.
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speculation that the jury must have given weight to the defendant's igno-
rance of this letter.
As an example of the reaction to the jury's verdict, consider the following
written by a Vancouver family physician, Dr. Gabor Mate, and published in
The Vancouver Sun on February 15, 1992:
The jury decision that a Vancouver gynecologist was negligent
in the case of a patient who became infected with the AIDS virus
illustrates the irrationality of negligence litigation....
As for the New England Journal letter, it presented only a
theory....
It should have given pause to anyone who read it, but as one if
its authors, Dr. Laurene Mascola, said at the trial, Korn could not
be blamed for not having seen it.
I subscribe to the Journal: it is one of many publications to land
on my desk every week. I consider myself lucky when I can read
some of the major articles of specific interest to me, let alone ab-
sorb all the arguments in the letters section.19
Is it, however, reasonable to conclude that the jury held Dr. Korn negli-
gent for not being familiar with one letter to the editor in one medical jour-
nal? I submit that it is not. I apply to the fact situation in Ter Neuzen v.
Korn the reasonable doctor and reasonable person analyses I introduced in
the first section of this essay. Since Ter Neuzen alleged negligence against a
medical professional, Dr. Korn, the standard used to assess his conduct is
the reasonable doctor test. Certainly, accepted medical practice does not
require Dr. Korn to be aware of every letter to the editor published in every
medical journal, even The New England Journal of Medicine. In this regard,
Dr. mate was entirely correct. However, as the Supreme Court of Canada
indicated in Chasney v. Anderson,2° Dr. Korn's conduct must also be as-
sessed against the standard of care required of the reasonable person. Ought
the reasonable person to have been aware, in January 1985, of the risk of
HIV transmission during an artificial insemination procedure in which fresh
semen is used?2
In order to comment on what the reasonable person ought to have known
about AIDS, HIV and HIV transmission as of January 1985, I move beyond
medical literature and approach the larger world of media-newspapers,
magazines, television, etc.-that is accessible to, and indeed unavoidable by,
all of us. I considered the coverage of AIDS, HIV, and HIV transmission,
19. Mate, supra note 15, at E9.
20. Chasney v. Anderson, [1950] 4 D.L.R. 223, 223 (Can.).
21. Dr. Korn used only fresh, not frozen, sperm in the artificial insemination procedures
performed for the plaintiff.
19931
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but rather against what the reasonable person knew or ought to have known
as of January 1985. To try to determine this, I investigated how frequently
AIDS, HIV, and HIV transmission were considered in the popular media up
to January 1985.22 In particular, I was interested in finding out whether
newspaper articles mentioned semen or sexual contact as a means of HIV
transmission and, if so, how frequently. My principal sources of information
were the newspaper index and the British Columbia Legislature Library (for
the years 1981 and 1982) and the Canadian Wire Service computer database
for the years 1983, 1984, and 1985, January only. Up to and including Janu-
ary 1985, there were at least 784 articles in Canadian newspapers dealing
with AIDS of which at least 60 raised the possibility that semen or sexual
contact were means of AIDS transmission. The number of relevant articles
is summarized in the following Table:
Number of articles
mentioning possibility that
Number of semen or sexual contact were





1985 (Jan. only) 12 4
Total 784 60
Based on this information, I submit that it is misleading to represent the
jury's verdict in Ter Neuzen v. Korn as indicating that they must have
thought that Dr. Korn ought to have been aware of the letter to the editor
published in The New England Journal of Medicine.2 3 Rather, I submit that
by January 1985 the reasonable person knew or ought to have known that
AIDS might be transmitted by semen or sexual contact. In particular, this
conclusion applies to a person who happens to be a gynecologist. Indeed,
Dr. Kom's knowledge about AIDS was no longer in issue at trial since he
admitted during pre-trial discovery that as of January 1985 he considered
AIDS to be a sexually transmitted disease. If the jury considered the source
of Dr. Kom's knowledge about AIDS at all, I submit that it is more
reasonable to speculate that they may have thought of their own awareness,
as reasonable people, of the general media coverage of AIDS. In this regard,
22. I was able to obtain quite comprehensive information concerning newspaper coverage.
I obtained some information concerning magazine coverage. I did not even attempt to deter-
mine television or radio coverage. However, the information obtained concerning newspaper
coverage is, I submit, sufficient for the position I argue in this essay.
23. See Mascola, supra note 17, at 1058.
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it is interesting to mention that Dr. Korn testified at trial that he read about
AIDS where everybody else did, namely, in Time magazine.2 4
III. CONCLUSION
The novel fact situation in Ter Neuzen v. Korn provided a vehicle for re-
minding those confronting medical negligence issues that a doctor's conduct
may be assessed against both the reasonable doctor standard and the reason-
able person standard.
24. I mention that I searched for decisions in common law jurisdictions other than British
Columbia in which an allegation against a doctor of negligent HIV transmission during an
artificial insemination procedure had been tried. I located only one such case, namely, Brown
v. Shapiro, 472 N.W.2d 247 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (Table, text in WESTLAW). In this case, the
plaintiff was administered semen from the same donor twice a month between August 1986
and April 1987, alternating fresh and frozen semen monthly. Shortly after the final
administration of semen, the donor tested HIV-seropositive. The plaintiff commenced her
action in September 1990. While she had not seroconverted, evidence indicated that she would
continue to be tested for HIV. After a jury trial, the defendant doctor was held not negligent
in his treatment of the plaintiff. The brief reasons of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals do not
touch upon the matter considered in this essay.
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